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MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ONE OF THE PROBLEMS 
OF THE MODERN POWER INDUSTRY 
 
The problem of Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Impacts (IDEI) on power systems has become recently more and more 
actual in connection with two modern trends: the extension of using microelectronics and microprocessor-based devices and sys-
tems in electric power industry – on the one hand, and the intensive design of special equipment for distance destruction of elec-
tronic devices and systems – with another. The most powerful method for such destruction is the High-altitude Electromagnetic 
Pulse (HEMP) as a result of a high-altitude nuclear explosion. The history of experimental high-altitude nuclear explosions has 
been known now for over half a century. During this time quite a few scientific articles and books presenting details of this phe-
nomenon and measures of protection from it have been published. In view of this fact, it would be possible to assume that the 
problem of protection against HEMP has been solved for a long time and modern power systems are well protected from this phe-
nomenon. However the research performed by the author displays that actually it has not and for the past decades in one country 
of the world, at least, no practical measures have been taken for the protection of the national infrastructures against HEMP and 
all action has been restricted only to writing reports, recommendations and guidelines. In the paper the reasons for such situation 
(in particular, political and military aspects of the problem) are analyzed. References 50, figures 5. 
Key words: High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse, Intentional Destructive Electromagnetic Impacts, power system, national 
infrastructure. 
 
Проблема преднамеренных дистанционных деструктивных воздействий (ПДДВ) на энергетические системы стано-
вится в последнее время все более и более актуальной в связи с двумя современными тенденциями: расширением ис-
пользования микроэлектроники и устройств на основе микропроцессоров в электроэнергетике – с одной стороны, и 
успехами, достигнутыми в разработке специальных видов оружия, предназначенных для дистанционного поражения 
электронных устройств – с другой. Самый мощный метод дистанционного поражения электроники – электромаг-
нитный импульс высотного ядерного взрыва (ЭМИ ЯВ). История экспериментальных высотных ядерных взрывов на-
считывает половину столетия. За это время было опубликовано множество научных статей, книг, отчетов, под-
робно описывающих все детали этого процесса и меры защиты от него. В связи с этим, можно было бы предполо-
жить, что проблема защиты от ЭМИ ЯВ была за эти десятилетия успешно решена и современные электроэнерге-
тические системы хорошо защищены от этого явления. Однако, исследование, выполненное автором, показывает, 
что ни в одной стране мира до сих пор не были предприняты никакие практические меры защиты национальных 
инфраструктур от ЭМИ ЯВ и все действия были ограничены только докладами, отчетами, рекомендациями. В дан-
ной статье проанализированы причины такой ситуации (в частности, политические и военные аспекты проблемы). 
Библ. 50, рис. 5. 
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электромагнитные воздействия, энергосистема, национальная инфраструктура. 
 
«…our vulnerability is increasing daily 
as our use of and dependence on electronics 
continues to grow in both our civil and military sectors» 
Dr. William R. Graham, 
EMP Commission's Chairman 
 
Introduction. The possibility using special weapons 
that can destroy an electric power system and other im-
portant elements of national infrastructure without a direct 
impact on a person is very alluring as it can result in a 
collapse of the whole country. Moreover, people respon-
sible for decision-making about weapon employment 
cannot be charged for the indiscriminate killing of civil-
ians, since this type of weapon does not impact on people 
directly. This type of weapon is represented by systems, 
which generate extra-powerful electromagnetic fields 
knocking electronic and electrically powered equipment 
out of service. 
The problem of Intentional Destructive Electromag-
netic Impacts (IDEI) impact on electric power systems 
has only recently become extremely relevant due to two 
modern trends: expanded use of micro-electronics and 
micro-processor equipment in the electric power industry 
on the one hand, and the intensive development of means 
for remote destruction of electronic instruments on the 
other hand [1]. Furthermore, the problem is relevant not 
only to such solely civilian fields as the electric power 
industry, but also to military personnel as military facili-
ties and ranges receive electric energy and water from the 
civilian systems, serious malfunctioning of which would 
inevitably affect the defense condition of an army with all 
its armament systems protected from IDEI. 
Brief Historical Background. The devastating im-
pact of a remote nuclear explosion on electronic equip-
ment was discovered during the initial trials of this new 
(for that time) type of weapon. Later on, theoretic sub-
stantiation of a High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse 
(HEMP) of a nuclear explosion was found in the aca-
demic works of Nobel Prizewinner for physics Arthur 
Compton, dating back to 1922. Military men have quickly 
appreciated the advantage of using this phenomenon as a 
weapon that can destroy the infrastructure and electric 
power systems of a rival at one go. The first attempts to 
study HEPM were conducted by the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Nuclear Safety Agency of the US 
Department of Defense on July 9, 1962 (the project en-
coded «Starfish Prime»). A thermo-nuclear warhead mis-
sile with a capacity of 1.44 Mega-tons was launched from 
a US military range located on Johnston Attol between 
Marshall and Hawaii Islands in Pacific Ocean. It reached 
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the height of 450 km and was deliberately exploded. This 
trial was one out of five high altitude nuclear explosions 
aimed at studying HEMP in the USA in 1962 within the 
framework of a more extensive project encoded 
«Operation Fishbowl». During these trials powerful elec-
tro-magnetic pulses were registered, which could vastly 
affect electronic equipment, communication and overhead 
transmission lines, radio transmission station and radars. 
They even knocked out street lighting in Hawaii, which is 
located about 1,500 km from the center of explosion [2]. 
In 1962 (on October 22, October 28 and November 1) 
the Soviet Union also conducted a series of high altitude 
nuclear explosions (each with a capacity of 300 kt) under 
the project called «Project-K» – K3-184; K4-187 and K5-
195 – the aim of which was to study the HEMP phe-
nomenon. The warhead missiles were launched from the 
Kapustin Yar missile launchpad in the Astrakhan region 
and were deliberately exploded at the heights of 60 – 290 
km above the territory of the military range in the Sary-
Shagan, Karaganda region, Kazakhstan (a restricted ac-
cess territorial subdivision Priozyorsk). In the USSR, the 
research of HEMP and preparation of those nuclear test 
explosions were conducted by Central Institute of Physics 
and Technology of Federal Ministry of Defense - CIPT 
(military unit 51105 or Central R&D Institute-12) in Ser-
giyev Posad, Moscow (now – Federal State Institution 
«12 Central R&D Institute of MoD of Russian Federa-
tion»). During one of these trials (K3-184) impulse cur-
rent of up to 3400 A was registered in aerial telephone 
line cables, which resulted in an emerging of pulse volt-
age with an amplitude of up to 28 kV; actuation of all the 
arresters installed in the equipment and blowing of all the 
fuses accompanied by shutdown of communication system; 
damage of radio communication systems located 600 km 
away from the center of explosion; outage of a radio sta-
tions located 1000 km away; damage of transformers and 
power generators at power plants; insulator punctures of 
overhead transmission lines (fig. 1). Serious damage of 
equipment was also reported at Baikonur Cosmodrome. It 
should be noted that this refers to equipment manufactured 
in 1960s, i.e., the one using electromechanical elements 
and vacuum tubes, which is much more resistant to IDEI 
than modern digital and micro-processor based equipment.  
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of equipment damages caused by high-
altitude HEMP impact above Kazakhstan in 1962. For the first 
time the picture was presented in English during the EUROEM 
conference by the Head of Central R&D Institute-12, Major 
General, Prof. Dr. Mr. V.M. Loborev in France in 1994 [3] 
 
Moreover, both American and Soviet researchers 
used thermo-nuclear explosives the electromagnetic pulse 
of which appeared to be 3-5 fold weaker than that emerg-
ing upon detonation of a ordinary nuclear explosive of the 
same capacity.  
The first valid information about HEMP and 
methods of protection in electric power industry. It is 
obvious that due to complexity, importance and high costs 
of test nuclear explosions the information about them was 
strictly confidential, so the first users of this information 
were military specialists. It is speculated that the first dis-
closure of such information dates back to the «Pere-
stroyka» era, when it was presented by the Head of Cen-
tral Physical and Technical Institution of the Ministry of 
Defense Major General Mr. V.M. Loborev during his 
reknowned speech at the EUROEM Conference in France 
in 1994. However, this is not true. It appears that the first 
publications of detailed and authentic evidence of HEMP 
parameters and its impact on the country's infrastructure, 
in particular the power supply systems, date back to late 
60s – early 70s of the last century. In other words this 
information has already been in public domain for 40-50 
years [4-23]. Moreover, some of these publications, (for 
instance [16, 18]) also contain description of protection 
measures against HEMP impact. The majority of these 
sources were published in the USA, so a conclusion can 
be made that the USA achieved unbeatable results in the 
field of protection of the most important components of 
their national infrastructure from HEMP over the last half 
of the century. Furthermore, the army should also be in-
terested in this. 
The actual state of the art in the field of protec-
tion of power systems from HEMP and other types of 
IDEI. 
«You can fool all the people some of the time; 
and some of the people all the time; 
but you cannot fool all the people all the time». 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
So, what is really happening in the USA and in the 
world in terms of protection of electric power industry 
and other extremely important systems constituting the 
country's infrastructure from IDEI impact? Perhaps, many 
things are happening based on the quantity of both gov-
ernmental and private entities dealing with this problem, 
which are financed from the country's budget at least in 
the USA. Here is the list of some of them: 
 Metatech Corp.; 
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS); 
 EMP Commission of Congress; 
 North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC); 
 Department of Energy; 
 Department of Defense (DoD); 
 Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 
(CIPAC); 
 Electric Infrastructure Security Council (EICS); 
 Defense Science Board (DSB); 
 US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM); 
 Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); 
 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); 
 Air Force Weapons Laboratory; 
 FBI; 
 Sandia National Laboratories; 
 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LINL); 
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 Oak Ridge National Laboratory; 
 Idaho National Laboratories; 
 Los Alamos National Laboratories; 
 Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.; 
 National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee; 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); 
 National Academy of Science; 
 Task Force on National and Homeland Security; 
 EMPrimus; 
 Neighborhood of Alternative Homes (NOAH); 
 EMPact America; 
 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); 
 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI); 
 NASA; 
 U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM); 
 SHIELD Act; 
 EMP Grid; 
 EMP Technology Holding; 
 Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA); 
 Walpole Fire Department. 
International organizations with USA participation: 
 International Electrotechnical Commision (IEC), 
Technical Subcommittee 77C 
 CIGRE, Working Group WG C4.206  
Doesn’t it seem suspicious that so many organiza-
tions from only one country are taking an active part in 
the subject supported by a huge number of published arti-
cles during the last decades and having no «white spots», 
which need to be further investigated? It appeared that the 
IDEI topic and particularly HEMP is nothing else than a 
wonderful «long-playing» tool of «bugging» the State 
budget. And it looks like nobody wants the «bugging» 
process to be finished by some certain actions aimed at 
the protection of electric power systems. To support this 
let me cite one of the former authorities of the US Minis-
try of Defense Dr. Ashton Carter: «The Army, Navy and 
Strategic Command continue to think about thinking 
about the problem». Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, director of the 
Task Force on National and Homeland Security said more 
specifically on this topic: «The problem is not the tech-
nology. We know how to protect against it. It’s not the 
money, it doesn’t cost that much. The problem is the poli-
tics. It always seems to be the politics that gets in the 
way«. In his book called «Apocalypse Unknown» (fig. 2), 
Dr. Pry complains at the fact that the situation is much 
better in some other countries (Israel, UK and Russia) 
compared to the USA, because they've already started the 
realization of some practical steps towards protection of 
electric systems. 
Let us calm Dr. Pry down. He doesn't need to be 
worried about the lagging of the USA. In actuality the 
situation in this area in, say, Russia is much worse than 
that in the USA, since the electric engineers there either 
didn't hear about the problem at all, or treat it as «Gure-
vich's horror stories» (as the only author writing on this 
topic in the Russian language literature is the author of 
this article). The situation is not better in other countries. 
So, it becomes clear why nothing specific has been done 
anywhere in the world regarding protection of electric 
power industry from IDEI and why all the efforts are lim-
ited by multi-page reports about investigations, presenta-
tions, workshops, conferences and other types of pleasant 
leisure in a circle of colleagues. The fact is that those mul-
tiple «participants of the process» are not interested in 
finishing the long-term investigation process, but prefer to 
keep the topic «afloat» in order to receive governmental 
financial proceeds. 
 
Fig. 2. The book by F. Michael Maloof «A Nation Forsaken», 
devoted to description of bureaucratic and political games re-
garding the IDEI problem in the USA (left) and the book by 
Peter Vincent Pry «Apocalypse Unknown» (right) 
 
This problem is discussed in the book of former Penta-
gon analyst Michael Maloof. «A Nation Forsaken» (fig. 2). 
The above mentioned Peter Vincent Pry also writes about 
serious bureaucratic hurdles related to this topic in his 
book called «Apocalypse Unknown». 
Representatives of the powerful Military-Industrial 
Complex (as president Eisenhower referred to it) also 
contribute to delaying the realization of well-known spe-
cific measures aimed at protection of electric power sys-
tems from IDEI. They insist that the only efficient protec-
tion from electro-magnetic pulses of a nuclear explosion 
is represented by the national Missile Defense System 
(MDS) where much more budgetary funds need to be 
invested. This attitude of these representatives becomes 
clear when comparing a relatively low cost of HEMP pro-
tection means for the most important elements and sys-
tems of the national infrastructure with the costs for de-
velopment and production of an efficient multi-level mis-
sile shield, which protects the whole country. As for other 
non-nuclear means of IDEI [1], since the MDS does not 
protect from them, it is easier to pretend that they do not 
exist and the information about them in the mass media is 
nothing more than a bluff aimed at scaring housewives. 
However, everything is not that easy. There are missile 
systems from which the MDS does not protect, i.e., they 
are not capable of protecting the national infrastructure 
from the impact of electro-magnetic pulses of a nuclear 
explosion. What kind of systems are they? 
Short- and intermediate-range missiles are poten-
tial sources of HEMP, against which the MDS are 
back-strapped. Today the tendency is to reduce the ca-
pacity of missile nuclear warheads due to improvements 
of their accuracy. For example, when a relatively accurate 
«Scarab B» with a circular error probable (CEP) of 250 m 
was equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 
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up to 200 kt (charge type AA-92) a more accurate and 
new «Stone» missile (fig. 4), with a CEP of 30 m can be 
equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of only 
50 kt (fig. 3). However, 50 kt is not enough to generate 
powerful and efficient HEMP. 
A well-publicized missile «Stone» which is claimed 
to be unique appears to be not that unique in reality. Is-
raeli missiles LORA (LOng Range Attack) possess very 
similar tactical and technical specifications, features of 
trajectory and control system. Moreover, compared to 
«Stone» their CEP is smaller (CEP = 10 m), the mass of 
their missile is two times less, their warhead mass is lar-
ger, they can carry a more powerful nuclear charge and 
they have a universal launching unit, which can be as-
sembled on different vehicles, including ships. The 
launching unit of LORA system manufactured as a con-
tainer with four missiles, which resembles the Russian 
containers Club-K with the same number of missiles 3M-
14KE, X-35UE (fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 3. Missile launchers of a battle-field support rocket SS-21 
«Scarab B» (Tochka-U) – above and tactical ballistic missile 
system SS-26 «Stone» (Iskander-E) – below 
 
The Club-K – Russian container-based missile unit, 
which can fit a standard 20- or 40-foot sea container, is 
intended for targeting above-water and ground targets. The 
unit can be installed on the coast lines, different classes of 
vessels, railway and truck platforms. The complex can be 
used with ground launching units as well as sea, railway 
and truck platforms. It can use the following anti-ship mis-
siles: 3М-54KE, 3М-54KE1, X-35UE and missiles for 
hitting ground targets, such as 3М-14KE, Х-35UE. All the 
missiles included in the complex are cruise missiles, flying 
at a relatively low altitude of 10-150 m and are not in-
tended to be equipped with nuclear warheads, while LORA 
is equipped with tactical ballistic missile, which can fly as 
high as 45 km and can carry high capacity nuclear charges 
at a distance of up to 300 km. 
Why do I pay so much attention to these missile sys-
tems? Because this type of relatively small missiles fitted 
into standard sea containers on ships near the coast line or 
even in ports (fig. 5) and capable of carrying nuclear 
charges over hundreds of kilometers while ascending to 
altitudes of several tens kilometers are the sources of 
HEMP invulnerable to any MDS both existing and poten-
tially developed due to their capability of concealed ap-
proach to a target, ultra-low approach time and changing 
trajectory during flight. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Container-based launching units of missile complexes 
Club-K (above) and LORA (below) 
 
The possibility of concealed approach of tactical 
warhead missiles of a small action radius to a target in 
order to avoid its interception by MDS on the one hand 
and to take it out of regulation of international treaties on 
the other hand, has long been known to specialists and the 
attempts to develop these systems started immediately 
upon creation of relatively small nuclear warhead mis-
siles. For example, in 1961 the US airborne units received 
«Little John» (MGR-3) missiles, which were equipped 
with free-flight rockets capable of carying nuclear war-
heads. Light-weight launch units of this system could be 
delivered by CH-47 «Chinook» helicopters both in the pit 
and on external lift. 
The Soviet Union quickly appreciated the advan-
tages of these systems and based on the Decree of the 
Council of Ministers of USSR No. 135-66 dated February 
5, 1962, the development of tactical missile complex 
«FROG-7» (9K53) with 9M21B rockets (nuclear war-
head) and 9M21B1 (thermonuclear warhead) and the 
launch unit 9P114 represented by a light-weight self-
propelled platform with a carburettor engine M-407 with 
a capacity of 45 h.p. from «Mosckvich-407» car. Later on 
several modifications of such systems were introduced, 
which allowed for transporting by MI-6 and MI-10 cargo 
copters. The helicopter was expected to deliver the rocket 
with its launch unit behind enemy lines. The rest of the 
way where necessary could by covered on wheels and 
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then it could suddenly strike a rocket from a position 
which the enemy did not consider, which translates it 
from a tactical complex into strategical one. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Containers resting on ships and in ports where tactical 
ballistic nuclear warhead missiles can fit are invulnerable to MDS 
 
The efforts of «FROG-7» development reached the 
stage of experimental samples testing. However, this re-
sulted in many obstacles including high «windage» of a 
helicopter carrying a launch unit and consequently high 
drifting rate as well as inappropriate flying range of fully 
loaded helicopters. As a result the efforts on development 
of this complex were discontinued in 1965. 
Modern technological level has made it possible to 
return to this idea and realize it successfully. Today, there 
are over a hundred million standard containers circulating 
all over the world (fig. 5). Who knows which of them are 
just containers and which of them carry rockets... While 
Israeli LORA is actually the only fully-featured container 
system, which can secretly approach to the coast line of a 
country on a container ship and hit its territory with an 
electro-magnetic pulse, the fact of existence of this sys-
tem allows us to conclude that the statements of MIS rep-
resentatives about efficient protection of advanced MDS 
against HEMP and that they should continue to receive 
additional investments are not true and in fact are a way 
of deceiving public opinion. In practice an army will not 
be able to ensure efficient protection of energy supply 
systems of cities and settlements from IDEI and thus, 
electric engineers should take the leading role and take 
care of such protection. 
What needs to be done in order to protect a coun-
try from an «electro-magnetic Armageddon»? Since all 
the necessary research efforts have already been con-
ducted and their results and practical recommendations 
are published in open sources [24-34] as well as covered 
in multiple standards of International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) [34-41], Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [42], military standards of 
US MoD [44-49], it is necessary to stop financing a large 
number of organizations speculating on this problem and 
using it as a source of their welfare and stream the free 
funds into performance of certain actions aimed at protec-
tion of electric energy systems from IDEI [50]. Those 
countries that do not have such branched network of or-
ganizations dealing with the problem like that of the USA 
should not follow the USA rather they should start creat-
ing similar entities, not doing so leads to a dead-end. The 
only organization that must be kept to manage the process 
should, in my opinion, be the National Coordination Cen-
ter on IDEI problem the purpose of which would be to 
analyze the published literature, develop a plan of certain 
actions within specific time frames, assign responsible 
people to observe performance of these time frames, issue 
specific technical requirements for the organizations with 
regard to protection of electric power supply systems 
from IDEI and then organize and coordinate their efforts. 
The results of these efforts should not be reports and con-
ferences (which must be simply prohibited!), but real sub-
stations and power plants protected from IDEI. 
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